By Julian Dodd

In this booklet, Dodd explains that correspondence theories of fact fail as the relation among actual suggestion and truth is identification, no longer correspondence. evidence aren't complexes of worldly entities which make strategies precise; they're simply real innovations. The ensuing modest identification theory enables a defensible deflation of the idea that of truth.

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Donald Davidson, no friend of correspondence theories of truth, agrees that if there are truthmakers, they have to be facts (construed as states of affairs). The correspondence theorist’s truthmakers, he claims, had better be ‘propositional in character’ (1990, p. 304). They must include as constituents ‘not only the objects the sentence is “about” . . but also whatever it is the sentence says about them’ (Davidson 1969, p. 49). For an admirably clear explanation of trope theory, see Daly (1997).

But this point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence ‘My skin is warm’ is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of evidence. (1974a, p. 194) 25. My attention was drawn to this remark by Oliver (1996, p. 72). 26. See note 9 above. 27. So it follows that Armstrong is wrong to say that the dispute between the realist and the nominalist concerning universals is a dispute, as he puts it, over whether the world is made up of states of affairs or of things (1980, p.

But granted that reference does not determine sense (that the relation between sense and reference is many-one), it follows that this is not enough to determine what its indirect sense is to be. Now let us consider double oratio obliqua, such as (9) Eleanor said that Lois Lane said that Superman can fly. It is plausible to think that embedding (1) Lois Lane said that Superman can fly within another occurrence of ‘said that’ has the same effect on it as did ‘said that’ on ‘Superman can fly’; so a Fregean must take the words comprising the content-sentence in (9) to have a doubly indirect reference Propositions, Indirect Speech and Truthbearers 27 and a doubly indirect sense.

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